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Influence of the Third-Term Issue: 
The Roosevelt and Willkie Presidential Campaigns of 1940 
 
Rob Sobelman ‘08 
 
 
 “Third Reich. Third International. Third Term.” 1 
-1940 Republican Campaign Button 
 
Every four years for the past 218 years, the United States of America has elected a 
president.  In the history of the United States, only the thirty-second president was elected 
for more than two terms.  President Franklin Delano Roosevelt ran a unique reelection 
campaign against Wendell Willkie in 1940 to win an unprecedented third term.  The 
campaign was waged in the midst of spreading war across Europe and growing fear of 
American entrance into international hostilities.  Due to the intensity of the political issues 
that were debated, the campaign season was particularly compelling.  However, the 
campaign was not unique because it was run during a time of uncertainty; it was unique 
because it was posing a question to the American people that had never been posed before: 
is the two-term tradition bigger than the presidential candidates?  Despite facing an 
opponent who attempted to liken a third term for Roosevelt to an American adoption of 
dictatorship, as referenced in the campaign collateral above, Roosevelt was able to 
overcome the third-term issue and win reelection. 
The longstanding tradition that no president would be elected for more than two 
terms was shattered by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in November of 1940.  Most 
historians attribute the ability of Roosevelt to win an unprecedented third term to the 
success of the New Deal and the fear of changing leadership in the context of prospective 
imminent war.  The debate over foreign and domestic policy in the 1940 presidential 
campaign season most likely decided the election for voters.  However, the campaigns 
themselves were not guided by these policy positions.   
This paper will argue that the third-term issue pervaded all political debate and was 
the single biggest factor shaping the strategy and rhetoric of both the Roosevelt and Willkie 
campaigns.  A misunderstanding of the importance of the third-term issue in the Roosevelt 
and Willkie campaigns of 1940 has led to an analytical gap between Roosevelt’s reelection 
to a third term and the ratification of the Twenty-Second Amendment just 11 years later. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 Private political button collection of Stephen H. Amos of St. Johnsbury, Vt. as cited in  
Benjamin L. Alpers, Dictators, Democracy, and American Public Culture, (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2003), 14. 
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Historiography 
Historians have pursued three 
questions regarding the third-term issue.  
The first is whether the two-term 
tradition was real or coincidental.  The 
second question that has been pursued is 
whether the dialogue about the third-
term issue in 1940 was substantive or 
simply politically driven.  The final 
question pursued is whether the third-
term issue was a deciding factor for voters 
in the 1940 presidential election.   
Historians Herbert Parmet and 
Marie Hecht concluded that the founders 
were wary of no term limits, but decided 
to leave the decision to the people and 
Electoral College to sort out on a case-by-
case basis with no two-term limit in 
mind.  Parmet and Hecht found that the 
tradition, which began with President 
George Washington, had no ideological 
grounding.  Rather, they concluded that 
“Washington did not reject a third term 
for ideological considerations.”1  Parmet 
and Hecht also found no evidence that 
President Thomas Jefferson or the other 
early presidents had any ideological 
reasoning for leaving office after two 
terms.  However, Parmet and Hecht 
found that the two-term tradition did 
“achieve a place in the folklore of 
American democracy” that was a 
powerful example of a safeguard against 
tyranny.2  Due to its place in American 
culture and society, it was compelling 
regardless of its factual basis and became 
real in the sense that it was an 
expectation that was highly valued. 
Regardless of the ad hoc nature of 
the tradition, Bernard Donahoe 
                                                
1 Herbert S. Parmet and Marie B. Hecht, Never 
Again: A President Runs for a Third Term, (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), 6. 
2 Ibid. 
established that it was a large enough part 
of American political culture to give 
Roosevelt significant hesitation.  
Donahoe found that “the intraparty 
struggle between 1937 and 1940 left 
President Roosevelt with little or no 
choice but to surrender party and 
national leadership to men he regarded 
as too conservative” if he should not 
stand for renomination himself.3  If there 
had been a clear successor within the 
Democratic Party with an ideology closer 
to Roosevelt’s who was a viable 
presidential candidate, it is likely that 
Roosevelt would have abided by the 
tradition.  However, Donahoe found that 
while the consideration of the third-term 
issue was as big a factor in Roosevelt’s 
decision as the impending war, Roosevelt 
felt the need to keep the New Deal 
coalition together by standing for 
reelection a third time.  Donahue 
concluded that there was no evidence 
that Roosevelt found the two-term 
tradition to be a particularly interesting 
challenge but served as a reason for 
hesitation instead.4 
The second area of analysis that 
has been pursued by historians is whether 
the dialogue leading up to the 1940 
presidential election regarding the third-
term issue was genuinely principled or 
simply politically motivated.  Eugene 
Roseboom found there were some who 
stood on principle against a third term 
for Roosevelt, but generally that the vocal 
opponents of the third term on 
“principle” were political enemies of 
Roosevelt in the two previous 
presidential elections. 
                                                
3 Bernard F. Donahoe, Private Plans and Public 
Dangers, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1965), viii. 
4 Ibid., ix. 
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 Eugene Roseboom concluded 
that there were two groups of voters who 
vocally opposed Roosevelt on the stated 
ground that they supported the two-term 
tradition.  The first group, conservative 
Democrats, would have likely rejected 
Roosevelt for a third term because of 
their opposition to the New Deal.  
However, they may not have felt 
comfortable publicly opposing Roosevelt 
due to his popularity within the party and 
nation.  Roseboom found that “the no-
third-term tradition [provided] a 
convenient bridge” and that “a long 
procession [of conservative Democrats] 
was soon crossing over to the Willkie 
camp.”5  While the number of 
conservative Democrats who publicly 
defected to Willkie was relatively small, 
public opposition within one’s own party 
gathered press coverage and raised 
questions of party solidarity on a national 
scale.   
Republicans were the second 
group of voters and would have opposed 
Roosevelt regardless of the term for 
which he was running.  However, the 
Republicans used the third-term issue in 
a sensationalist fashion when the 
“Republican newspapers and orators 
proclaimed that dictatorship was 
imminent and democracy itself [was] in 
dire peril.”6  Willkie and his followers 
regularly claimed that reelecting 
Roosevelt was voting for dictatorship and 
against democracy.  Roseboom found 
that there were some who genuinely 
opposed a third term on principle, but 
that the majority of them would have 
                                                
5 Eugene H. Roseboom, A History of Presidential 
Elections: From George Washington to Richard M. 
Nixon, 3rd ed., (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1970), 471. 
6 Ibid., 472. 
opposed Roosevelt regardless of the third-
term issue. 
 Parmet and Hecht also conclude 
that the dialogue about the third-term 
issue in 1940 by the opponents of 
Roosevelt was disingenuous.  Parmet and 
Hecht found that the third-term issue was 
used “as a weapon” by “those 
who…would have denied Mr. Roosevelt a 
first [term].”7  As with Roseboom’s 
conclusion, Parmet and Hecht found that 
there was likely some legitimate concern 
about breaking the two-term tradition but 
the political discourse surrounding the 
issue was pervaded by purely political 
motivations among those who would 
have opposed Roosevelt regardless of the 
number of terms he had served or any 
tradition. 
 The most visible figure that 
criticized Roosevelt for attempting to 
break the two-term tradition was 
predictably Willkie.  Charles Stein found 
that the third-term issue made the 1940 
presidential campaign season a 
particularly “bitter one” that included a 
significant amount of “mud-slinging.”  
For example, Willkie constantly referred 
to Roosevelt as “the third-term 
candidate.”8  This was a not-so-subtle way 
for Willkie to remind voters of 
Roosevelt’s purported selfishness and 
arrogance while also showing disrespect 
for the sitting president.  It is important 
to note that Stein identified this clear 
example of Willkie’s reliance on anti-
third-term rhetoric in an attempt to 
convert Roosevelt supporters to his cause. 
                                                
7 Herbert S. Parmet and Marie B. Hecht, Never 
Again: A President Runs for a Third Term, (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), x. 
8 Charles W. Stein, The Third-Term Tradition, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1943), 336. 
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 Another historian, Warren 
Moscow, found that Willkie’s rhetoric 
often became hyperbolic when predicting 
a future America with Roosevelt as 
president for a third term.  Moscow 
found that Willkie often predicted that 
“totalitarianism would come within the 
four years of that term” and that the 
1940 election could be “the last free 
election the nation would ever see.”9  
Moscow concluded that the American 
people as a whole did not buy into 
Willkie’s predictions and was an example 
of how the third-term issue played a role 
in his rhetoric as a candidate for 
president. 
Some recent historians were 
quick to dismiss the third-term issue’s 
role in the 1940 presidential election in 
favor of the argument that the entire 
campaign season revolved around 
American foreign policy and the growing 
fear of American involvement in a 
foreign war.  While there are no 
historians who have claimed that the 
third-term issue did or should have taken 
precedence over foreign policy, the 
historians who wrote closer to the 
election itself found that the third-term 
issue played a significant role and would 
potentially have been dominant if not for 
fear of a looming war. 
In 1943, Charles Stein wrote a 
book entitled The Third-Term Tradition 
that concluded that the fear of war was 
the dominant issue that did indeed settle 
the election.10  However, he argued that 
the 1940 election was a unique situation 
and that in any other set of circumstances 
                                                
9 Warren Moscow, Roosevelt and Willkie, 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1968), 145. 
10 Charles W. Stein, The Third-Term Tradition, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), 
328. 
the third-term issue would have easily 
defeated a president even as popular as 
Roosevelt.  Stein’s book was the first 
written on the third-term issue after the 
1940 election and was written in the 
midst of World War II.  In it, Stein 
predicted that breaking the tradition 
would affect the country significantly.  Of 
course, he was correct and the Twenty-
Second Amendment, preventing a third 
term from ever occurring again, passed 
Congress just four years after his book 
was published.  Stein argued that while 
the third-term issue was not the deciding 
factor in 1940, it was certainly a 
contributing factor.11 
In 1947, Edgar Robinson wrote a 
book entitled They Voted for Roosevelt that 
concluded the war most likely decided 
the election in favor of Roosevelt.  
However, Robinson argued that 
Roosevelt’s “candidacy violated the ‘no-
third-term’ tradition” and therefore 
became one of the three issues of 
“transcendent importance” in the 
campaign season.12  Having been 
published just as a movement in 
Congress emerged to constitutionally 
limit presidential terms of office, the use 
of the world “violated” is an indication of 
the emerging national consensus in favor 
of what became the Twenty-Second 
Amendment. Additionally, Robinson 
found the third-term issue debate gave 
way to devolution of political discourse 
ending in “the bitterest national election 
in half a century.”13  Similarly to Stein, 
Robinson argued that while the third-
                                                
11 Charles W. Stein, The Third-Term Tradition, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), 
339. 
12 Edgar Eugene Robinson, They Voted for 
Roosevelt: The Presidential Vote 1932-1944, (Palo 
Alto: Stanford University Press, 1947), 15. 
13 Ibid. 
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term issue was not the deciding factor in 
1940, it had enormous effects on the 
political discourse of the time. 
In 1965, Donahoe found that 
even though the impending war allowed 
Roosevelt to overcome the third-term 
issue in the general election, it was not 
the war that led to the Democratic 
nomination.  Rather, the third-term issue 
was so important that there was concern 
it would “spell political suicide” for the 
Democratic Party and would require a 
new candidate for president.14  Donahoe 
found that the third-term issue was so 
significant that it caused the Democratic 
Party to look beyond the war and grapple 
with issues such as the economy in order 
to settle the intraparty fight over whether 
to renominate Roosevelt.  Stein and 
Robinson found that the third-term issue 
had widespread effects within the larger 
political discourse.  Donahoe looks at the 
discourse within the Democratic Party 
and finds similar, if not greater, effects of 
the third-term issue on the renomination 
debate.15 
 
Roosevelt’s Campaign Strategy and Rhetoric 
President Roosevelt and his 
political advisors were very sensitive to 
the fact that the third-term issue could 
potentially keep him from being reelected 
despite his high approval ratings.  To 
minimize the negative effect of this 
potentially devastating issue, Roosevelt 
decided not to run publicly for the 
nomination.  Additionally, once he was 
nominated he decided that his most 
effective campaign strategy would be to 
                                                
14 Bernard F. Donahoe, Private Plans and Public 
Dangers, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1965), viii. 
15Bernard F. Donahoe, Private Plans and Public 
Dangers, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1965), viii-ix. 
limit the amount of time he spent 
campaigning and instead focus on his job 
as president, or at least appear to do so.  
Through a close analysis of Roosevelt’s 
campaign statements, announcements, 
and acceptance speech this section of the 
paper will address the key role that the 
third-term issue played in guiding his 
campaign strategy.  Additionally, the 
diary of one of Roosevelt’s most trusted 
advisors, Secretary of the Interior Harold 
L. Ickes, provides insight into the 
motivations and behind-the-scenes 
strategy discussions of the Roosevelt 
campaign. 
Roosevelt and his advisors knew 
that if he was to appear ambitious and 
eager for a third term, he would receive 
significant and legitimate criticism that 
he was becoming too powerful and 
staying in office too long.  While 
Roosevelt seemed to understand the 
importance of two-term tradition to the 
American people, he did not display 
much personal dismay at attempting to 
break it.  However, he knew that the only 
way he could return to the White House 
for a third term was to let the 
nomination come to him. 
As early as February of 1940, 
Ickes recorded conversations he had with 
Roosevelt about campaign strategy and 
managing the nomination process.  In 
one entry, he wrote that Roosevelt was 
discussing whether his name would be on 
the ballot in various states and said, 
“…nor have I been asked to have my 
name put on the ballot in Ohio.  I have 
seen to it that I wasn’t asked.  I have 
arranged it differently.”16  Roosevelt 
managed the nomination process from 
                                                
16 Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. 
Ickes, vol. 3, The Lowering Clouds, (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1954), 122. 
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behind the scenes in order for him to 
avoid even discussing publicly whether he 
would run for a third term. 
 In addition to managing the 
nomination process in the states, 
Roosevelt unsuccessfully pushed for the 
Democratic National Committee (DNC) 
to hold the nominating convention after 
Labor Day rather than in July when DNC 
Chairman Jim Farley wanted it to be.  
Part of the motivation may have been 
that Roosevelt wanted more time to make 
up his mind about running, but Ickes 
wrote that “the later the convention, the 
longer he will have to announce whether 
he would be a candidate or not, and this 
would distinctly be to the disadvantage of 
those who are now striving for 
Democratic delegates.”17  Ickes’ 
interpretation in his diary is that the 
chief result of Roosevelt’s convention 
plan was that there would be little chance 
for a Democratic candidate to challenge 
Roosevelt for the nomination. 
Roosevelt issued a statement two 
days before the nomination was to take 
place to the Democratic National 
Convention on July 16, 1940, stating that 
he “has never had, and has not today, any 
desire or purpose to continue in the 
office of President.”18  He claimed he was 
too busy being president to travel to 
Chicago and make the speech himself.  
He added that the delegates should feel 
free to vote for any candidate and that he 
had exerted no influence in selecting the 
nominee.19  However, it was clear to all 
that he was to become the candidate just 
two days later and that his statement did 
                                                
17 Ibid. 
18 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “The President States 
He Does Not Seek to Be a Candidate for a Third 
Term,” The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, Vol. 1940, no. 69, 292. 
19 Ibid. 
not mean he would not accept the 
nomination.  It was a brilliant political 
move and it was widely written that 
Roosevelt was “drafted” by the 
Democratic Party. 
For example, in The New Republic 
there was a two-part series by R.G. 
Tugwell and John T. Flynn in which they 
answered the question: “Must We Draft 
Roosevelt?”20,21  In the first part of the 
series, Tugwell argued that was 
imperative for Roosevelt’s supporters to 
publicly advocate for the Democratic 
Party to nominate Roosevelt regardless of 
any statement that might say “I do not 
choose to run.”  Instead, he dismisses the 
third-term issue and concludes that “a 
third term for Mr. Roosevelt is, in Mr. 
Laski’s words, ‘an essential condition of a 
decent peace.’”22   
In response to Tugwell’s article, 
Flynn wrote that the third-term issue was 
not “a bogey invented by sinister men 
who want to keep the government weak,” 
by keeping “an amateur President in the 
White House.”23  Flynn argued against 
Tugwell’s characterization of the third-
term issue as a farce and creation of those 
who were simply anti-Roosevelt.  Rather, 
Flynn argued that it is best to have 
“professional Presidents” that retire after 
two terms “after which we will have to fall 
back on some rank amateur.”24  This two-
part series was a typical dialogue over the 
“drafting” of Roosevelt and the 
                                                
20 R.G. Tugwell, “Must We Draft Roosevelt?” The 
New Republic, May 13, 1940, 630-633. 
21 John T. Flynn, “Other People’s Money,” The 
New Republic, May 20, 1940, 671-672. 
22 R.G. Tugwell, “Must We Draft Roosevelt?” The 
New Republic, May 13, 1940, 633. 
23 John T. Flynn, “Other People’s Money,” The 
New Republic, May 20, 1940, 672. 
24 John T. Flynn, “Other People’s Money,” The 
New Republic, May 20, 1940, 672. 
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implications of the third-term issue that 
appeared in newspapers and magazines 
throughout 1940. 
Three days after his statement, 
Roosevelt accepted the nomination for a 
third term from the Democratic National 
Convention at 12:25am on July 19, 1940 
via radio address from the White House.  
He began by stating that he had “mixed 
feelings” and that he would like to retire 
but his “conscience” told him to accept 
the nomination.25  Roosevelt was brilliant 
in conveying reluctance in this speech 
and playing down his personal ambition.  
Additionally, he went one step further to 
frame the discussion in such a way that 
resulted in his acceptance of the 
nomination being perceived as him doing 
the American people a favor.  He stated 
that when he was reelected in 1936, “it 
was my firm intention to turn over the 
responsibilities of Government to other 
hands at the end of my term,” and that 
two terms as president “would normally 
entitle any man to the relaxation that 
comes from honorable retirement.”26  By 
framing the discussion in this way, most 
listeners would not have been able to 
avoid feeling a sense of gratitude for 
Roosevelt’s acceptance of the 
nomination.  This is the way in which he 
engaged the American public throughout 
the following five-month campaign 
season, by reminding them that he would 
like to retire and offering to continue 
only by the goodness of his own sense of 
duty. 
The most telling line about his 
campaign strategy in the entire speech 
                                                
25 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “The President Accepts 
the Nomination for a Third Term,” The Public 
Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. 
1940, no. 70, 293. 
26 Ibid. 
was when he stated that he “shall not 
have the time or the inclination to engage 
in purely political debate.”27  In this 
speech, he stated that he would simply be 
too busy with being president and would 
have no time or interest in engaging in 
political debate.  While many citizens 
might have said they didn’t want to hear 
purely political debate, it is what a 
campaign for president essentially 
consists of.  The way in which we choose 
our office holders in the United States is 
through lively, public political debate to 
decide what values and policies we think 
are most important.   
Roosevelt was able to run a 
minimalist campaign by making his role 
as president extremely public.  For 
example, just a month after his 
nomination by the Democratic Party, he 
went on a three-day tour of New 
England’s governmental and private-
sector defense infrastructure.  Some 
newspapers and magazines questioned his 
motives for such a trip, but he received 
enormous amounts of positive press 
coverage.  For example, in a Life article 
covering this tour, he was pictured 
inspecting troops and equipment as no 
one but the president can do.  Some of 
the captions in the article read, “here the 
President passes the drydock, in which 
the big submarine Bass is being refitted,” 
and “at Naval Training Station the 
President reviewed new recruits on 
parade ground.”28  The pictures and their 
captions sent a message stronger than any 
campaign could without the fear of 
                                                
27 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “The President Accepts 
the Nomination for a Third Term,” The Public 
Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. 
1940, no. 70, 298. 
28 Life, “President Campaigns for Third Term 
Against Backdrop of National Defense,” August 
26, 1940, 24. 
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exposure on the third-term issue by 
engaging in overt campaigning. 
Roosevelt knew that if he was to 
run a regular campaign and put himself, 
the New Deal, and his foreign policy at 
the center of the debate he would have to 
spend an enormous amount of time and 
resources responding as any candidate for 
reelection might.  Moreover, this would 
exacerbate the third-term issue.  If he ran 
for a second term in 1940 under the 
same circumstances, he would most likely 
have not been able to get away with 
running a non-traditional campaign.  
Roosevelt was more entrenched, known, 
and popular than most candidates 
running for a second term would be.  
Additionally, Roosevelt knew that if he 
was to run a conventional campaign in 
unconventional circumstances with the 
third-term issue hanging over his head, 
he may have had publicly debate that 
issue.  He knew that he was good at being 
president and that the only issue he could 
not control was the fact that he was 
running for an unprecedented third 
term. 
 This strategy was presented by 
Roosevelt to his closest advisors on July 
11, 1940, one week before he received 
the nomination from the Democratic 
Party.  Ickes wrote in his diary a detailed 
account of the meeting in which 
Roosevelt discussed the type of campaign 
he would want to run and shared his idea 
for the New England defense 
infrastructure trip.  According to Ickes, 
Roosevelt stated that “since his 
justification to run again would be the 
international emergency, he said that he 
could not campaign the country but 
would stay in Washington or within a few 
hours of it.”29  Roosevelt did not state 
that he could not travel far from 
Washington for real national security 
reasons, but rather for political reasons 
that would be presented as part of his 
national security focus. 
 When sharing his idea for the 
New England defense infrastructure trip, 
Roosevelt was similarly shrewd in 
calculating the public image generated by 
his actions.  Roosevelt suggested the trip 
because it “would make it possible for 
him to emphasize what was being done in 
the way of preparation for war,” while 
not overtly seeking the presidency even 
though Ickes “gathered nothing from the 
President to make me feel certain that he 
had not fully made up his mind to run 
again.”30  Roosevelt would spend his time 
as the president focusing on issues 
relevant to his reelection rather than as a 
candidate for the presidency 
campaigning.   This strategy conveniently 
avoided his coming off as overambitious 
or overtly political. 
Staying true to his campaign 
strategy as publicly stated in July, 
Roosevelt did not campaign at all or give 
any public indication about his intention 
until October 18, 1940 when the White 
House put out a brief statement laying 
out the goal and structure of his 
campaign.  The minimal activity on his 
part had become the strategy itself 
because of the third-term issue.  A month 
before the statement, Ickes and Attorney 
General Bob Jackson were asked by 
Roosevelt to put together a speaking tour 
of his surrogates in order to keep up an 
                                                
29 Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. 
Ickes, vol. 3, The Lowering Clouds, (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1954), 238. 
30 Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. 
Ickes, vol. 3, The Lowering Clouds, (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1954), 238. 
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active campaign without Roosevelt’s 
public involvement.  Roosevelt wanted 
Ickes, Jackson and White House Press 
Secretary Steve Early “to go on the air 
with a speech answering the charges of 
‘dictatorship’ and its relationship to a 
third term.”31  Ickes told Roosevelt that 
he had “all the material on this and it 
would be no trouble at all to put it in the 
shape of a speech.”32  With this new 
charge, Ickes published a pamphlet 
entitled The Third Term Bugaboo later that 
month in addition to his various 
speaking engagements. 
The title of Roosevelt’s October 
1940, statement, “White House Release 
on the President’s Personal Entrance into 
the Presidential Campaign of 1940,” is 
groundbreaking in and of itself.33  For a 
president to sit out his own reelection 
campaign and then publicly acknowledge 
his lack of campaign activity in this kind 
of public statement is highly unusual. 
The statement began by quoting 
his acceptance speech to remind the 
public that Roosevelt “shall never be 
loath to call the attention of the nation 
to deliberate or unwitting falsifications of 
fact.”34  With simple correction of fact as 
the stated goal of his upcoming campaign 
involvement, the White House indicated 
that Roosevelt would tell the American 
people what misrepresentations have 
been made and “make five speeches 
                                                
31 Ibid., 324. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “White House Release 
on the President’s Personal Entrance into the 
Presidential Campaign of 1940,” The Public Papers 
and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. 1940, 
no. 116, 481. 
34 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “White House Release 
on the President’s Personal Entrance into the 
Presidential Campaign of 1940,” The Public Papers 
and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. 1940, 
no. 116, 481. 
between now and election day.”35  
Making only five speeches was perhaps 
the least amount Roosevelt could possibly 
have done for his campaign.  Most 
presidential candidates before 1940, even 
incumbents, made dozens if not 
hundreds of campaign speeches in the 
time between Labor Day and Election 
Day.  Roosevelt knew that he had to limit 
his public perception of wanting the 
third term in order to get it.  If he 
displayed the ambition to break the 
tradition and serve for another four years, 
many Americans would question his 
motives and his effect on democracy in 
America as was seen in commentary 
sections of numerous magazine and 
newspaper publications. 
For example, The Christian Century 
published an endorsement of Wendell 
Willkie on October 16, 1940, entitled 
“No Third Term!”  In this four page 
endorsement, the majority of the 
commentary regarded an opposition to a 
third term on principle.  The Christian 
Century wrote “we are opposed to a third 
term for any president, because the very 
fact that he covets it, and that he has a 
fighting chance to win it, implies the 
presence of the precise conditions which 
make a third term dangerous for the 
country.”36  The endorsement specifically 
cited the ambition for a third term as the 
factor that lead to their opposition.  This 
widely read magazine came out against 
Roosevelt on this basis which was 
reflective of the opinion of many 
Americans at the time. 
 With Roosevelt’s minimalist five-
speech campaign set in motion, he 
openly engaged Republicans on foreign 
                                                
35 Ibid. 
36 The Christian Century, “No Third Term!” 
October 16, 1940, 1270. 
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and domestic policy but avoided overtly 
discussing the third-term issue.  I argue 
that a close analysis of Roosevelt’s 
campaign speeches and his final radio 
address reveals the subtle, yet pervasive 
role that the third-term issue played in 
the rhetoric he chose to use throughout 
the campaign. 
On October 23, 1940, Roosevelt 
gave the first of his five campaign 
speeches in Philadelphia.  As was 
promised in the White House release 
discussing his campaign plans, Roosevelt 
did not lay out a platform or pontificate 
on one of his policy goals.  In fact, Ickes 
noted in his diary that Roosevelt 
requested that his platform be kept “as 
short as five hundred words, if possible,” 
which did not leave Roosevelt anything 
new to discuss.37  Instead, he spent the 
time pointing out what he saw as 
falsifications by Willkie and other 
Republicans.  At the beginning of his 
speech he stated that “truthful campaign 
discussion of public issues is essential to 
the American form of government” and 
reminded listeners that he would not be 
speaking out at all if it were not for the 
untruthful campaigning of his 
opponent.38  While Roosevelt did go into 
great depth about American foreign and 
domestic policy issues in his five 
campaign speeches, he did not even 
mention the third-term issue by name or 
engage it directly in any sense.  However, 
he did make many references to 
continuing democracy and free elections. 
                                                
37 Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. 
Ickes, vol. 3, The Lowering Clouds, (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1954), 235. 
38 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “The Opening of the 
1940 Presidential Campaign.,” The Public Papers 
and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. 1940, 
no. 119, 486. 
 Some of the references to 
preserving democracy were reactions to 
charges that the New Deal was bringing 
about communism, socialism, or 
dictatorship in America.  However, some 
of the references to protection of 
democracy would be out of context or 
misplaced within the speech if construed 
as being a defense of the New Deal.  If 
these specific references to democracy 
and freedom were interpreted as a subtle 
defense of his third-term nomination, 
they become relevant and contextual. 
 For example, Roosevelt made 
reference to the charge by his Republican 
opposition that “the election of the 
present Government means the end of 
American democracy within four years.”39  
He dismissed this charge as being untrue, 
melodramatic, and disingenuous political 
discourse.  To prove that he does truly 
revere American democracy, he stated 
that he believed “the Presidency is a most 
sacred trust,” to communicate an 
understanding of the meaning of the 
office he held and the third-term issue.40  
By using grand statements such as this, 
Roosevelt was able to convey his view that 
he did not view himself as one with the 
presidency itself, but rather one lucky 
enough to serve as a president.  
 Throughout this five speeches, 
Roosevelt often emphasized the 
principles of American democracy and 
the rights that it gave the American 
people.  Particularly, he focused on the 
ability it gave them to freely and openly 
elect their governmental leaders.  In a 
subtle argument, Roosevelt pitted the 
                                                
39 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “The Opening of the 
1940 Presidential Campaign,” The Public Papers 
and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. 1940, 
no. 119, 487. 
40 Ibid., 488. 
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two-term tradition against freedom of 
choice for the American people.  In his 
November 2, 1940 campaign speech in 
Cleveland he stated that “Americans are 
determined to retain for themselves…the 
right to choose the officers of their own 
Government in free elections.”41  Rather 
than react to the third-term issue in an 
overt and defensive fashion, he chose to 
make free choice of governmental leaders 
one of the principles he campaigned on. 
 At the end of his speech in 
Cleveland, Roosevelt reassured the 
American people that they would succeed 
in the face of the international challenges 
“before the next term is over,” and that 
“when that term is over there will be 
another President, and many more 
Presidents in the years to come.”42  While 
most presidents running for reelection 
would not have wanted voters to picture 
others serving in their position, Roosevelt 
went out of his way to highlight that he 
would not serve forever.  It is likely that 
he made this reference to subtly address 
the fears of his supposed endless 
ambition. 
 After his five official campaign 
speeches, Roosevelt made one final radio 
address on the eve of the election from 
his home in Hyde Park, New York.  In 
this address, he made one of the least 
subtle references to the third-term issue 
of his entire campaign.  He reminded the 
voters that the question they were to 
answer on November 5, 1940, was: “Who 
do I think is the best candidate best 
qualified to act as President?”43  The 
                                                
41 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Campaign Address at 
Cleveland, Ohio,” The Public Papers and Addresses 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. 1940, no. 128, 547. 
42 Ibid., 552. 
43 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Final Radio Speech of 
the 1940 Presidential Campaign,” The Public 
question not only simplified the thought 
process but also ignored issues to focus 
on qualifications.  At that point, he had 
been president for nearly eight years and 
was almost objectively well-qualified to 
continue holding the office.  Instead, 
Roosevelt’s opposition was opposed to 
his domestic policy, foreign policy, and 
his attempt to break the two-term 
tradition. 
 After he iterated the question that 
voters should ask themselves at the ballot 
box, Roosevelt argued that democracy 
was safeguarded by the very fact that the 
electorate had “the right to determine for 
themselves who should be their own 
officers of Government” and “the right to 
place men in office, at definite, fixed 
dates of election for a specific term.”44  
Roosevelt felt the need to assure the 
American people that his reelection did 
not mean the end of democracy in 
America but rather the election itself was 
the protection of democracy.  He argued 
that the outcome was only the result of 
democracy, not democracy itself.  Using 
rhetoric that addressed the institutional 
implications of democracy, Roosevelt was 
able to counter those who argued that 
voting for Roosevelt was voting for 
dictatorship. 
 Roosevelt’s campaign strategy 
minimized the amount of time he spent 
campaigning or engaging his opponent, 
but it necessitated active and aggressive 
campaigning on behalf of several 
surrogates including Ickes, Jackson, 
Senator Joseph Guffey, and then-
Secretary of Agriculture and Vice-
                                                                 
Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. 
1940, no. 129, 555. 
44 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Final Radio Speech of 
the 1940 Presidential Campaign,” The Public 
Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. 
1940, no. 129, 555. 
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Presidential Nominee Henry Wallace.  In 
addition to speaking tours where they 
addressed the third-term issue, Ickes 
authored a pamphlet and Guffey 
authored a book entitled Roosevelt Again!  
Ickes and Guffey were the two public 
figures that openly and overtly addressed 
the third-term issue on Roosevelt’s 
behalf.  Ickes’ pamphlet and Guffey’s 
book made similar arguments but 
differed in detail and length. 
 Ickes was likely the most active 
campaigner in Roosevelt’s cabinet.  
Roosevelt asked Ickes very shortly after 
being nominated “to be the spearhead in 
the campaign.”45  In this role, he traveled 
extensively and met with many of 
Roosevelt’s political allies across the 
country.  Ickes wrote The Third Term 
Bugaboo shortly after his conversation 
with Roosevelt about the third-term issue 
in September of 1940.  Roosevelt and 
Ickes were particularly worried because 
the opposition was being extremely 
aggressive against their minimalist 
campaign.  In his diary, Ickes wrote that 
“in Chicago on Friday, Willkie made 
some seven speeches.  He got right down 
into the sawdust ring to prove that he was 
one of the people.”46  With the growing 
popularity of Willkie’s energetic 
campaign, Ickes organized a new speaking 
tour and published the pamphlet to 
overtly engage the third-term issue rather 
than continue to address it subtly. 
 The Third Term Bugaboo began by 
explaining that “everyone knows that the 
Third Term is not the real issue in this 
campaign.  The real issue is whether a 
                                                
45 Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. 
Ickes, vol. 3, The Lowering Clouds, (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1954), 268. 
46 Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. 
Ickes, vol. 3, The Lowering Clouds, (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1954), 325. 
democratic people should have the right 
to choose an experience and trusted 
leader.”47  Ickes carefully established this 
premise so that he was not perceived to 
engage the issue on a political level, but 
rather as an institutional question.  Ickes 
then explained that he wrote the 
pamphlet because “the opponents of 
President Roosevelt are using the Third 
Term bogey against him” and are “trying 
to create the impression that the Third 
Term is unconstitutional, unpatriotic, 
and a violation of the express will of the 
Founding Fathers.”48  The pamphlet 
contained quotes from the Founding 
Fathers, explanations of practical reasons 
why various two-term presidents did not 
seek a third term, and a final chapter 
about Roosevelt. 
 Ickes argued that the American 
people should not “let the third-term 
bugaboo interfere with your preference 
for a Presidential candidate.”49  Rather, 
he argued that the two-term tradition 
grew out of a series of coincidental 
retirements and happenstance.  In the 
chapter on Roosevelt, Ickes quoted 
several supportive members of Congress 
including Representative Hamilton Fish, 
Jr., who stated that he “would like to see 
this third time issue decided by the 
people,” rather than by Roosevelt or 
politicians.50  Ickes was not the only 
surrogate of Roosevelt that made these 
set of arguments on his behalf. 
 According to Ickes’ diary, Guffey 
was an associate and ally of Ickes within 
                                                
47 Harold L. Ickes, The Third Term Bugaboo, 1940, 
i. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Harold L. Ickes, The Third Term Bugaboo, 1940, 
38. 
50 Ibid., 45. 
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Roosevelt’s campaign.51  Guffey’s 120-
page book did not focus entirely on the 
third-term issue as Ickes’ pamphlet did, 
but it was one of the main subjects 
addressed.  Guffey opened his book by 
referring to the third-term issue as a “so-
called ‘tradition’” and asking, “Is it a 
fundamental principle of American 
democracy?”52  He answered his question 
by stating that it was not a fundamental 
principle but was instead “a political 
hobgoblin, used by scheming politicians 
to scare the people away from candidates 
the people want.”53  This argument was 
similar to Ickes’ argument because it 
argued that the third-term issue was only 
a creation of Roosevelt’s opponents and 
not something to be taken seriously by 
voters. 
 However, it is important to note 
that both of these books were written on 
the topic on behalf of Roosevelt and 
dozens of speeches were made around the 
country on the same topic.  This was a 
serious campaign issue regardless of how 
it came to exist in the political discourse 
of the campaign season.  Guffey goes on 
to argue that as Americans we must be 
“unhampered by the dead weight of age-
old traditions,” and echoed Roosevelt’s 
argument that “the people can have what 
they want under a democracy.”54  This 
argument provides a way to identify 
Roosevelt’s subtle arguments addressing 
the third-term issue in the campaign 
speeches he made. 
                                                
51 Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. 
Ickes, vol. 3, The Lowering Clouds, (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1954), 321. 
52 Joseph F. Guffey, Roosevelt Again! (Philadelphia: 
Frankling Publishing Company, 1940), 7. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Joseph F. Guffey, Roosevelt Again! (Philadelphia: 
Frankling Publishing Company, 1940), 9, 12. 
 The most useful argument found 
in Guffey’s book discussed the 
relationship between the third-term issue 
and the New Deal in Willkie’s campaign.  
Guffey wrote that the American people 
“are witnessing today a repetition of an 
old custom in political life – that of 
frightening the people with the shadow 
in order to deny them the substance.  
The shadow is the third term ‘tradition.’  
The substance is the Roosevelt New 
Deal.”55  He went on to claim that the 
opponents of Roosevelt are falsely 
claiming to support principles of 
democracy for their own political gain.  
This passage is extremely useful in 
deciphering whether Willkie’s campaign 
language was directly or indirectly 
addressing the third-term issue or the 
New Deal. 
 The context in which Ickes’ 
pamphlet and Guffey’s book was 
published was important in the 
understanding of their impact on the 
political discourse regarding the third-
term issue.  There were two books 
published in 1939 and 1940 that were 
completely dedicated to addressing the 
third-term issue.  The first was entitled 
The Third Term Issue by Willis Thornton, 
a historian and journalist.  Thornton 
addressed the third-term issue’s 
constitutional implications as well as the 
historical precedents set by former 
presidents as far back as Washington.  
Thornton concluded that “the appeal to 
sheer tradition as such is untrue to the 
best American spirit.  Better is the appeal 
to reason…not, ‘Has this been done 
before?’, but simply, ‘Is this wise?”56  His 
argument is consistent with Ickes and 
                                                
55Ibid., 119. 
56 Joseph F. Guffey, Roosevelt Again! (Philadelphia: 
Frankling Publishing Company, 1940), 119. 
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Guffey that there is not much historical 
weight to the two-term tradition but 
argued that it could have merit but needs 
to be consciously accepted rather than 
grandfathered into American politics. 
The second book published on 
the third-term issue was entitled 
Democracy and the Third Term by Fred 
Rodell, a professor at Yale Law School.  
Rodell attempted to address the third-
term issue from an objective standpoint 
and subtitled his book “A handbook for 
both sides.”  Rodell found that the 
political discourse regarding the third-
term issue was generally insincere and 
unprincipled.  He wrote that “views on 
the third term issue, though expressed in 
impersonal and abstract terms, have a 
way of shifting from one extreme to the 
other,” depending on what candidate is 
being discussed.57  Rodell authored the 
book in the hope of providing some 
principled argumentation to guide the 
discussion of the third-term issue 
regarding Roosevelt.  Rodell concluded 
that the two-term tradition’s history was 
“largely accidental” and that the 
Republican Party should have addressed 
issues of domestic and foreign policy 
rather than the third-term issue if the 
Party wanted to win the presidency.58 
In addition to these books and 
The Christian Century endorsement of 
Willkie, the The New Republic’s defense of 
Roosevelt’s campaign for a third-term was 
significant in the public discussion of the 
third-term issue.  In “Who Willed the 
Third Term,” The New Republic argued 
that “Roosevelt himself desired not to 
run again, and so told many of his 
                                                
57 Fred Rodell, Democracy and the Third Term, (New 
York: Howell, Soskin & Company, 1940), 9. 
58 Ibid., 114, 129. 
confidants.”59  The article concluded that 
Roosevelt was truly drafted into the 
campaign and he was not overly 
ambitious because he did not seek a third 
term. 
The books and articles that were 
written by journalists, historians, and 
Roosevelt’s surrogates are testament to 
the weight of the third-term issue.  
Roosevelt overcame the two-term 
tradition not by a strong, forceful 
campaign that had him at its center but 
instead he stayed behind the scenes and 
ran a campaign that was perceived as 
minimalist and almost reluctant.  
Roosevelt’s surrogates were able to 
address the issue directly and provide 
enough argumentation to counter the 
attacks from Willkie’s campaign.  This 
type of campaign allowed Roosevelt to 
avoid confronting charges of becoming 
too powerful or dangerously ambitious. 
 
Willkie’s Campaign Strategy and Rhetoric 
 Wendell Willkie’s only run for 
office was for president in 1940.  He was 
a very complex individual who had never 
served in public office and had supported 
Roosevelt in his elections for a first and 
second term.  However, Willkie took 
issue with many of Roosevelt’s policies 
and used the third-term issue as a way to 
transition to the opposition.  To 
understand the role of the third-term 
issue in Willkie’s campaign, this section 
will provide close analysis of Willkie’s 
nomination pledge and acceptance 
speech.  They are predictive of Willkie’s 
campaign strategy and rhetoric used 
throughout the 1940 campaign season. 
On June 28, 1940, Willkie made 
a speech to the Republican National 
                                                
59 The New Republic, “Who Willed the Third 
Term?” July 29, 1940, 134. 
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Convention acknowledging that he had 
been selected as the presidential nominee 
of the Republican Party that he called “A 
Pledge to the Delegates of the Republican 
Convention.”60  In the body of this 
speech, Willkie mentioned general 
foreign policy and domestic policy goals 
that he intended to fight for as the 
presidential nominee.  However, he 
opened by stating that he pledged to 
work for the “preservation of American 
democracy.”61  While Willkie and 
Roosevelt both discussed the protection 
of the American homeland in the 
potential instance of an attack or 
invasion, Willkie did not refer to such 
attempts when he discussed preserving 
American democracy rather than 
America itself.  Instead, Willkie made the 
argument that a vote for him was a vote 
for democracy rather than dictatorship.  
He stated that in this election American 
democracy “is facing the most crucial test 
it has ever faced in all its long history.”62  
He made the argument subtly in this 
pledge but it sets the stage for more overt 
arguments to be made later in the 
campaign. 
On August 17, 1940, Willkie 
delivered his official speech accepting the 
Republican Party nomination in Elwood, 
Indiana.  In this speech, Willkie 
elaborated and extended the subtle 
argument he had made pitting himself 
and democracy against Roosevelt and 
dictatorship.  He stated that the purpose 
of the speech was to “give you an outline 
of the political philosophy that is in my 
heart,” which was essentially “the 
                                                
60 Wendell Willkie, “A Pledge to the Delegates of 
the Republican Convention,” This is Wendell 
Willkie, (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 
1940), 253. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid., 254. 
preservation of American democracy.”63  
As in the pledge given at the Republican 
National Convention, Willkie aligned 
himself with American democracy and 
implied that Roosevelt threatened 
American democracy.   
It is likely that Willkie was 
referring both to the New Deal and the 
third-term issue when making the 
sweeping statement about American 
democracy.  Guffey countered this charge 
by writing, “the fact is that those who 
would impose the restriction of tradition 
upon the will of the people do so because 
they do not believe in democratic 
government.”64  A significant portion of 
the rhetoric between Roosevelt’s 
campaign and Willkie’s campaign was a 
battle over the high-ground of principled 
American democracy. 
Rather than arguing over foreign 
policy and the protection of America 
itself, Willkie set up the debate around 
what is best for American democracy.  
The two biggest advantages of framing 
the political dialogue in this way were 
that the third-term issue had bipartisan 
appeal and it avoided engaging foreign or 
domestic policy.  Willkie attempted cross-
party appeal by stating that “party lines 
are down” and that 1940 was a time 
when Americans of all parties could come 
together to stop “all special privileges and 
forms of oppression.”65   The balance of 
the speech was spent telling a story from 
his childhood that emphasizes how when 
he was young he always believed that “any 
                                                
63 Wendell Willkie, “Speech of Acceptance,” This 
is Wendell Willkie, (New York: Dodd, Mead & 
Company, 1940), 259. 
64 Joseph F. Guffey, Roosevelt Again! (Philadelphia: 
Frankling Publishing Company, 1940), 87. 
65 Wendell Willkie, “Speech of Acceptance,” This 
is Wendell Willkie, (New York: Dodd, Mead & 
Company, 1940), 259-260. 
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young man might become President,” 
and that American leaders are not 
necessarily “members of the ruling or 
wealthy classes.”66  By painting a picture 
of the presidency as a humble, accessible 
office, Willkie attempted to create a 
sharp contrast between the intention of 
the presidency and Roosevelt’s third-term 
ambitions.  He attempted to appeal as the 
candidate who was not elitist or overly 
ambitious in addition to establishing that 
those were the qualities that should be 
found in a president. 
Toward the end of the speech, 
Willkie chose to address the third-term 
issue directly, but he did so carefully.  He 
stated that he “should like to debate the 
question of the assumption by this 
President, in seeking a third term, of a 
greater public confidence than was 
accorded to our presidential giants.”67  
Rather than overtly stating that Roosevelt 
is overly ambitious or is attempting to 
break a sacred American tradition, he 
said he would like to simply discuss it 
and made the “proposal respectfully to a 
man upon whose shoulders rest the cares 
of the state.”68  Willkie was not as harsh 
as might have been regarding the third-
term issue because Roosevelt was 
extremely popular and Willkie did not 
feel personally invested in the principled 
third-term opposition.   
While Willkie did use rhetoric 
referring to the third-term issue, he was 
more concerned with the New Deal and 
foreign policy than he was the two-term 
tradition.  After he lost to Roosevelt, 
Willkie stayed in the public eye until he 
                                                
66 Ibid., 261. 
67 Wendell Willkie, “Speech of Acceptance,” This 
is Wendell Willkie, (New York: Dodd, Mead & 
Company, 1940), 278. 
68 Ibid. 
died in October of 1944.  Just prior to his 
death, he published a proposed 
Republican Party platform entitled An 
American Program in which he did not 
mention the third-term issue at all.  The 
chapter on the centralization of power in 
the United States made no mention of 
Roosevelt’s breaking of the third term 
tradition even though it would have been 
quite apt in supporting his argument.69  
The lack of continued concern about the 
third-term issue only highlights the 
likelihood that Willkie engaged the issue 
primarily for political purposes rather 
than on principle. 
In September of 1940, Ickes 
addressed Willkie’s use of the third-term 
issue in his diary.  He wrote that Willkie 
“hasn’t raised a single effective issue as 
against the President.  So barren is he of 
issues that he has been campaigning 
recently almost entirely upon the third-
term issue.”70  Willkie had been 
campaigning since June, several months 
ahead of Roosevelt, and had not yet 
gained traction on any political issue 
against Roosevelt. 
In addition to winning votes from 
Republican and independent voters, 
Willkie’s advocacy for the protection of 
the two-term tradition was an easy excuse 
for some active Democrats to oppose 
Roosevelt.  For example, Ickes wrote of 
the defection of Senator Hiram Johnson 
in October of 1940 on these very 
grounds.  According to Ickes, four years 
before Johnson would have come “out 
for a man whom he would have despised 
and fought with every ounce of his 
                                                
69 Wendell Willkie, An American Program, (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1944), 3. 
70 Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. 
Ickes, vol. 3, The Lowering Clouds, (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1954), 331. 
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strength four years ago.”71  However, he 
was a staunch isolationist and moved to 
oppose Roosevelt in the 1940 campaign 
season.  Rather than oppose Roosevelt 
publicly over their difference in foreign 
policy, Johnson joined the Willkie 
campaign and his “pretended reason” was 
the third-term issue.72  This was not the 
choice of many influential Democrats, 
but it did provide an easy excuse to those 
looking to leave Roosevelt’s campaign. 
 
Conclusion 
While Roosevelt knew he could 
not win if he allowed the third-term issue 
to be central to the political dialogue, 
Willkie also knew that he could not win 
if it were not a part of every aspect of his 
campaign for president.  Therefore, 
Willkie framed his campaign around 
preserving American democracy with the 
third-term issue front and center.  It was 
easy for him to link the New Deal and 
Roosevelt’s foreign policy to this theme 
but it would have not have had any 
grounding without the third-term issue at 
its core. 
On November 5, 1940, Roosevelt 
shattered the two-term tradition by 
carrying 38 states with 449 electoral votes 
and 55 percent of the popular vote.73  In 
1947, Congress passed an amendment to 
the Constitution limiting the presidency 
to two terms which was ratified in 1951.  
The third-term issue was forever relegated 
to history, never to be factor in a 
presidential campaign again.  However, 
in the 1940 presidential campaign it was 
the single biggest factor shaping the 
                                                
71 Ibid., 355. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ross Gregory, Wendell Willkie, ed. James H. 
Madison (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1992), 64. 
strategy and rhetoric of both the 
Roosevelt and Willkie campaigns.  
Domestic and foreign policy differences 
may have decided the 1940 election, but 
without an understanding of the impact 
of the third-term issue, it is difficult to 
contextualize the amendment of the 
Constitution just 11 years later. 
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